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   <title>The Risk Factor</title>
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   <id>tag:blogs.spectrum.ieee.org,2008:/riskfactor//12</id>
   <updated>2008-07-04T15:49:36Z</updated>
   <subtitle>Software failures and successes dissected daily</subtitle>
   <generator uri="http://www.sixapart.com/movabletype/">Movable Type 3.35</generator>

<entry>
   <title>Playing I Spy at the State Department</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/2008/07/playing_i_spy_at_the_state_dep.html" />
   <id>tag:blogs.spectrum.ieee.org,2008:/riskfactor//12.4897</id>
   
   <published>2008-07-04T15:05:19Z</published>
   <updated>2008-07-04T15:49:36Z</updated>
   
   <summary> There is a story today in several news outlets about an audit by the US State Department&apos;s Inspector General (IG) office that found that found American passport records were being viewed without authorization on a regular basis. The audit...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Robert Charette</name>
      
   </author>
         <category term="Security" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   <category term="600" label="Privacy" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="644" label="Security" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/">
      <![CDATA[<img alt="Peek.gif" src="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/Peek.gif" width="200" height="200" />

There is a <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/vcCandidateFeed2/idUSN0325409520080703">story</a> today in several news outlets about an audit by the US <a href="http://oig.state.gov/">State Department's Inspector General</a> (IG) office that found that found American passport records were being viewed without authorization on a regular basis.

The audit was conducted to see the extent of snooping after the presidential candidates passport records were found to be <a href="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/2008/03/sen_obamas_passport_data_impro.html">looked at</a> illegally.

The IG put together a list of 150 famous Americans and checked how many times they were accessed over a five and half year period. Unless there is a renewal, some information is being changed, or there is a national security reason, passport information should not be accessed.

Investigators found that 127 of those on the list - or some 85% - had been searched a total of more than 4,100 times. One unnamed celebrity's record was viewed 356 times by more than 70 people.

According to the <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/03/AR2008070303799.html?hpid=topnews">story</a> in the <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/">Washington Post</a>, "The inspector general made 22 recommendations for improving security, but many of them -- and much of the report -- were redacted because officials feared they would provide a road map to further abuse of the system."

Wonderful.

I guess no one should be surprised. A few weeks ago there was a <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/PCWorld/story?id=3223852">story</a> on how one-third of IT administrators admitted to routinely <a href="http://www.cyber-ark.com/news-events/pr_20080619.asp">snooping</a> through corporate files. 

As noted in the story, "One IT administrator laughingly said: 'Why does it surprise you that so many of us snoop around your files, wouldn't you, if you had secret access to anything you can get your hands on?' "

Yet another reason for senior executives, who don't need any encouragement, not to trust their IT departments.













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   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>12,000 Laptops Lost Per Week at Airports?</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/2008/07/12000_laptops_lost_per_week_at.html" />
   <id>tag:blogs.spectrum.ieee.org,2008:/riskfactor//12.4895</id>
   
   <published>2008-07-03T17:03:24Z</published>
   <updated>2008-07-03T22:21:07Z</updated>
   
   <summary> I came across this story at Dark Reading about a study published by the Ponemon Institute and Dell Computer that estimates that 12,000 laptops are lost in US airports every week. In addition, they claim that only about 3,600...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Robert Charette</name>
      
   </author>
         <category term="Aviation" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
         <category term="Security" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   <category term="644" label="Security" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/">
      <![CDATA[<img alt="Laptop.gif" src="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/Laptop.gif" width="175" height="175" />

I came across this <a href="http://www.darkreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=158099&WT.svl=news1_1">story</a> at <a href="http://www.darkreading.com/default.asp">Dark Reading</a> about a <a href="http://www.dell.com/content/topics/global.aspx/services/prosupport/en/us/exec_summary?c=us&l=en&s=gen">study </a>published by the <a href="http://www.ponemon.org/">Ponemon Institute</a> and <a href="http://www.dell.com/content/default.aspx?c=us&l=en&s=gen">Dell Computer</a> that estimates that 12,000 laptops are lost in US airports every week. In addition, they claim that only about 3,600 are recovered. Furthermore, over half of those lost have confidential business or customer data on them. 

The study says that <a href="http://www.lawa.org/lax/">LAX</a> reports that about 1,200 laptops are lost there each week. I was at first skeptical of this number, but given that nearly a million passengers per week <a href="http://www.lawa.org/lax/volTraffic.cfm">pass through</a> LAX and that according to Transportation Security Administration (<a href="http://www.tsa.gov/">TSA</a>) 25% of all travelers carry laptops, I guess the number isn't so unreasonable after all.

If the study is accurate, this means that about 600,000 laptops are being lost yearly in the US. According to the story, laptops are usually kept by the airports for some period of time, and then destroyed.

Not surprisingly, most of the laptops are lost at the security checkpoints or the departure gate.

As the Dark Reading story notes, "Interestingly, only 1 percent of the respondents admitted personally losing a laptop computer. However, 84 percent say they know someone who has lost a laptop while traveling on business."

In a related <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/business/01road.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=laptops&st=cse&oref=slogin">story</a> this week in the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/">New York Times</a>, TSA has approved a newly designed carry-on bags that will let laptops pass through security without having to be removed for the X-ray inspection. The new bags are expected to be available by September or October from <a href="http://www.pathfinderluggage.com/">Pathfinder Luggage</a> and <a href="http://www.targus.com/">Targus</a> among others, I assume.

This should, hopefully, reduce the number of lost laptops.

Update: On my <a href="http://cfc.wjla.com/mainsearch.cfm?ref=home&k=laptop&x=0&y=0">local news</a> channel tonight, a reporter claimed that airport officials at Dulles International Airport said they disagreed with the study results. Dulles officials said they had only about 400 laptops lost all of last year, not the 400 per week that the study estimated, and that most "lost laptops" were returned to their owners. 

Stay tuned - there may be more to this story.

 ]]>
      
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>Moody&apos;s Ethics Error</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/2008/07/moodys_ethics_error.html" />
   <id>tag:blogs.spectrum.ieee.org,2008:/riskfactor//12.4893</id>
   
   <published>2008-07-02T13:56:28Z</published>
   <updated>2008-07-03T08:34:34Z</updated>
   
   <summary> The credit rating agency Moody&apos;s announced yesterday that &quot;following a comprehensive review of its ratings process for European constant-proportion debt obligations (CPDO), it has initiated employee disciplinary proceedings and accelerated measures to strengthen its rating and monitoring processes.&quot; The...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Robert Charette</name>
      
   </author>
         <category term="Ethics" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
         <category term="Simulation" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
         <category term="Software" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   <category term="677" label="Ethics" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="961" label="Glitch" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="1093" label="Software" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/">
      <![CDATA[<img alt="Moody.gif" src="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/Moody.gif" width="100" height="99" />

The credit rating agency <a href="http://www.moodys.com/cust/default.asp">Moody's</a> <a href="http://ir.moodys.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=319118">announced</a> yesterday that "following a comprehensive review of its ratings process for European constant-proportion debt obligations (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CPDO">CPDO</a>), it has initiated employee disciplinary proceedings and accelerated measures to strengthen its rating and monitoring processes." 

The disciplinary action was taken in the wake of a <a href="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/2008/05/moodys_rating_bug_gives_credit.html">computer error</a> in its models used to assess the risk in CPDO's that led to about $1 billion worth of the securities to be incorrectly rated.

Moody's says that its investigation showed that "its personnel did not make changes to the methodology for rating European CPDOs to mask any model error."

However, Moody's personnel did violate the <a href="http://www.moodys.com/cust/content/Content.ashx?source=StaticContent/Free%20Pages/Regulatory%20Affairs/Documents/professional_conduct.pdf">Moody's Code of Professional Conduct</a>, which says that " a committee may consider only credit factors relevant to the credit assessment and may not consider the potential impact on Moody's, or on an issuer, an investor or other market participant." 

In essence, once the computer error was discovered, it wasn't immediately disclosed as required - people kept quiet as a means to try to mitigate the possible consequences (reputation, financial, etc.) to Moody's and maybe themselves.

There is a very interesting story today in the <a href="http://www.ft.com/home/us">Financial Times</a> of London (which broke the original story in May), about how financial instruments like CPDOs "are so fiendishly complex that they can only be valued with the help of a computer - or in some cases, several computers running a programme over the course of several days."

The story goes on, "In some ways, this shift has been a boon for the agencies such as Moody's. It has meant that most asset managers have been unable to work out the value of instruments such as CPDOs by themselves - forcing them to rely on the ratings agencies' models for guidance. Indeed, even among the investment banks there has been a growing tendency to use rating agency models, at least for preliminary product design."

However, the story notes:

"In other ways, this increased trend towards complexity - and model usage - has also turned into a rating agency curse. For as investment banks have competed furiously with each other to push more products out into the market, groups such as Moody's have faced pressure to produce more and more ratings - placing their own models under growing levels of stress."

Finally, the Times story goes on to say that, "the CPDO incident may now leave investors, issuers and regulators asking new questions about the reliability of all the other complex computer models being used to rate other financial instruments. And that, in turn, leaves the financial world in a subtle trap. Nobody can see any alternative to using models, given how complex products have become; however, trust in these models is far from high."







 ]]>
      
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>Data Breaches Soaring?</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/2008/07/data_breaches_soaring.html" />
   <id>tag:blogs.spectrum.ieee.org,2008:/riskfactor//12.4890</id>
   
   <published>2008-07-01T13:45:50Z</published>
   <updated>2008-07-01T14:06:54Z</updated>
   
   <summary> A story in today&apos;s Washington Post states that according to the Identity Theft Resource Center in San Diego, reported data breaches are up 69% from a year ago. The Identity Theft Resource Center, according to its website, is a...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Robert Charette</name>
      
   </author>
         <category term="Security" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   <category term="644" label="Security" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/">
      <![CDATA[<img alt="CD_Object.gif" src="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/CD_Object.gif" width="100" height="127" /> 

A <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/30/AR2008063002123.html">story</a> in today's <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/">Washington Post</a> states that according to the <a href="http://www.idtheftcenter.org/">Identity Theft Resource Center</a> in San Diego, reported data breaches are up 69% from a year ago. 

The Identity Theft Resource Center, according to its website, is a nonprofit group that is "dedicated exclusively to the understanding and prevention of identity theft."

The group <a href="http://www.idtheftcenter.org/artman2/uploads/1/ITRC_Breach_Report_20080627.pdf">identified</a> 342 breach reports from 1 January to 27 June, with more than one-third being from businesses. This was up by 27% from last year.

Data breaches among health-care providers and banks now account for 15% and 10% of the breaches respectively, with both increasing over last year as well.

Lost or stolen laptops, lost tapes and the like were given as causing the most breaches, whereas hacking was the least cited reason. About 15% of the breaches were inadvertent postings of personal or financial data on-line.

The group did put a caveat on its numbers, however. As reported in the Post story, "Linda Foley, the center's co-founder, said it is difficult to say whether the numbers show an increase in breaches, an increase in reporting, or both. She said better state laws on data breach notification also might be encouraging more companies to audit their own security measures."]]>
      
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>Software Problems Close Tunnel in Sydney for Fifth Time</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/2008/06/software_problems_close_tunnel.html" />
   <id>tag:blogs.spectrum.ieee.org,2008:/riskfactor//12.4888</id>
   
   <published>2008-06-30T20:38:41Z</published>
   <updated>2008-07-01T00:11:05Z</updated>
   
   <summary> Papers in Australia reported last week that a computer failure closed the M5 tunnel in Sydney. According to the papers, this is the 5th time that the AU$794 million 4.5 km long tunnel suffered a closure since it opened...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Robert Charette</name>
      
   </author>
         <category term="Software" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   <category term="961" label="Glitch" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="602" label="IT Systems" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/">
      <![CDATA[<img alt="sydney.gif" src="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/sydney.gif" width="200" height="134" />

Papers in Australia <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/computer-stops-city-and-thats-the-fifth-time/2008/06/25/1214073342057.html">reported</a> last week that a computer failure closed the <a href="http://www.rta.nsw.gov.au/constructionmaintenance/completedprojects/m5east/index.html">M5 tunnel</a> in Sydney. According to the papers, this is the 5th time that the AU$794 million 4.5 km long tunnel suffered a closure since it opened in 2001.

Last week's closure began at 0710 and lasted until about noon, affecting tens of thousands motorists and causing traffic jams kilometers long. Technicians did try to go to the back-up system, but that failed as well. No reason has been given yet as to why the primary and its back-up system failed.

Yesterday, it was <a href="http://www.news.com.au/dailytelegraph/story/0,22049,23938688-5011660,00.html">estimated</a> that 27,000 motorists gave up in frustration and took a sick day as a result of the tunnel closure. 

Two days before the tunnel failure, a computer problem on Sydney's <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spit_Bridge">Spit Bridge</a> (its a <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bascule_bridge">bascule</a>, or lift bridge) at 1930 kept it open until about 2200, which affected thousands of motorists as well. 

Being ever so <a href="http://www.bananasinpyjamas.com/news/stories/2008/06/24/2284312.htm">helpful</a>, a government city planner said the next day that if those motorists who were left waiting just lived closer to downtown Sydney instead of the suburbs, they wouldn't have been affected by the bridge problem.

That bit of advice didn't go down especially well.

The tunnel computer failure is reminiscent of the one that <a href="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/2007/12/seattle_bus_tunnel_computer_st.html">shut down</a> Seattle's bus tunnel last December. That one lasted for a couple of days. Good thing that didn't happen in Sydney - who knows how many Sydney workers would have called in sick.]]>
      
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>Faulty Software In Medical Devices</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/2008/06/faulty_software_in_medical_dev.html" />
   <id>tag:blogs.spectrum.ieee.org,2008:/riskfactor//12.4861</id>
   
   <published>2008-06-30T14:43:48Z</published>
   <updated>2008-06-30T15:12:27Z</updated>
   
   <summary>The Baltimore Sun has an article today about faulty software in medical devices. It states that, &quot;Of 23 recalls last year that the FDA classified as life-threatening, three involved faulty software.&quot; The article notes that the US Food and Drug...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Robert Charette</name>
      
   </author>
         <category term="Health" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
         <category term="Software" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   <category term="961" label="Glitch" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="1639" label="Medical Technology" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="1093" label="Software" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/">
      <![CDATA[The <a href="http://www.baltimoresun.com/">Baltimore Sun</a> has an <a href="http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/health/bal-te.fda30jun30,0,912831.story">article</a> today about faulty software in medical devices. It states that, "Of 23 recalls last year that the <a href="http://www.fda.gov/">FDA</a> classified as life-threatening, three involved faulty software."

The article notes that the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) set up a forensic software unit in 2004 to help investigate potential software problems in medical devices after noticing that manufacturers were increasingly sending out recall notices related to software.

The story also noted that an <a href="http://www.americanheart.org/presenter.jhtml?identifier=3009582">implantable defibrillator</a> might contain over 100,000 lines of code.

Given that for <a href="http://www.fda.gov/CDRH/devadvice/3132.html">Class III medical devices,</a> the <a href="http://www.supremecourtus.gov/">US Supreme Court</a> has this year made manufacturers essentially <a href="http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/07pdf/06-179.pdf">immune</a> from lawsuits once the FDA has approved them for use, I hope the FDA forensic team is working hand-in-glove with the FDA internal organization approving those devices about what it is finding and what needs to be checked before approval is given.]]>
      
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>Brain Drain Hurting US Defense</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/2008/06/brain_drain_hurting_us_defense.html" />
   <id>tag:blogs.spectrum.ieee.org,2008:/riskfactor//12.4853</id>
   
   <published>2008-06-25T23:54:01Z</published>
   <updated>2008-06-26T00:17:18Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Today’s New York Times had a story on the problems the US government is having in attracting young engineers and computer scientists into defense work. As I noted a while ago, engineers and computer scientists would rather work in the...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Robert Charette</name>
      
   </author>
         <category term="Aviation" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
         <category term="Government" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   <category term="2884" label="Defense" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="752" label="Engineering Education" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/">
      <![CDATA[Today’s <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/">New York Times</a> had a <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/25/us/25engineer.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1&ref=us">story</a> on the problems the US government is having in attracting young engineers and computer scientists into defense work. As I <a href="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/2008/02/us_aerospace_industry_doomed.html">noted</a> a while ago, engineers and computer scientists would rather work in the commercial sector than in government.

The article interviewed <a href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Paul_G._Kaminski">Dr. Paul Kaminski</a>, the former Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology from 1994 to 1997, about the brain drain which has become a “big factor in a breakdown in engineering management that has made huge cost overruns and long delays the maddening norm.” 

The loss of expertise from the retirement of engineers/computer scientists has coincided with the inability to recruit replacements. As a result, both the engineering and management talent needed in defense programs is lacking.

Kaminski also highlighted in the article the critical deficiency in systems engineering expertise found in defense programs. He recently headed a <a href="http://www.nationalacademies.org/">National Academy</a> study on systems engineering (or better put, the lack thereof) in the US Air Force which resulted in a report published earlier this year titled, “<a href="http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12065">Pre-Milestone A and Early-Phase Systems Engineering: A Retrospective Review and Benefits for Future Air Force Acquisition</a>.” 

So what happens when systems engineering expertise is missing? 

Kaminski noted a military satellite system, for instance, that was “designed to detect foreign missile launchings that ... [which] was inexplicably designed with two sensors that cannot operate simultaneously on the same spacecraft without extensive, costly shielding to prevent electromagnetic interference generated by one from disabling the other.”

Another? How about “a complex network of communications satellites that the Pentagon started building without a coherent plan for integration with an existing system or a consistent set of requirements to accommodate the needs of the four military services.”

Obviously, when these types of basic elements are missing, program costs and schedules increased dramatically, and the systems don't deliver what was originally promised or expected.

As a side note, I interviewed Dr. Kaminski among many other former and current defense acquisition officials for an upcoming article on defense acquisition which is scheduled for publication in IEEE Spectrum this fall. He is a very fascinating person to talk to as well as one who is universally and very highly respected by his peers in both industry and government.
]]>
      
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>Wisconsin Drivers Get Whacked By Illinois Toll System</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/2008/06/wisconsin_drivers_get_whacked.html" />
   <id>tag:blogs.spectrum.ieee.org,2008:/riskfactor//12.4851</id>
   
   <published>2008-06-24T21:31:39Z</published>
   <updated>2008-06-25T09:34:59Z</updated>
   
   <summary> A few months back, I wrote about how the Illinois State Toll Highway Authority was sending violation notices to the wrong addresses, leaving some drivers to miss out on the opportunity to pay their fines before the fines dramatically...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Robert Charette</name>
      
   </author>
         <category term="Cars" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
         <category term="Software" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
         <category term="Technology and Society" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
         <category term="Transportation" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   <category term="1403" label="Technology and Society" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/">
      <![CDATA[<img alt="Illinois-toll.gif" src="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/Illinois-toll.gif" width="200" height="67" />

A few months back, I <a href="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/2008/01/holes_in_illinois_automatic_hi.html">wrote</a> about how the <a href="http://www.illinoistollway.com/portal/page?_pageid=133,1397397&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL">Illinois State Toll Highway Authority</a> was sending violation notices to the wrong addresses, leaving some drivers to miss out on the opportunity to pay their fines before the fines dramatically increased or their driver's licenses were suspended.

Now the Toll Authority's new computer system used to check vehicles traveling on the Illinois tollway using the <a href="http://www.illinoistollway.com/portal/page?_pageid=133,1392734&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL">I-PASS</a> (electronic toll payment transponder) was found to have a software problem that affected Wisconsin drivers.

According to an AP <a href="http://www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2008/06/19/ap5136249.html">story</a>, Wisconsin I-Pass users whose transponders didn't register when going through a toll (as sometimes happens) didn't match up properly during a tollway enforcement system validation cross-check between Illinois and Wisconsin I-Pass records. As a result, the Wisconsin drivers got a fine for using an "expired" I-Pass transponder or for not owning one at all.

The root cause of the problem was, according to the story, that "the new Illinois computer system allowed Wisconsin drivers signing up for the I-PASS to identify their vehicle as a 'passenger' car. But Wisconsin records listed the license plates as an 'auto.' " The incompatibility was why the databases didn't sync up when checked and Wisconsin drivers got whacked even though they had working I-Pass transponders. 

Why the incompatibility existed in the first place wasn't explained. 

No one seems to know how many Wisconsin drivers have been affected, either, and it will take at least another six months before the situation can be cleared up.
]]>
      
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>Medicare Officials Don&apos;t Want to Scare Seniors</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/2008/06/medicare_officials_dont_want_t.html" />
   <id>tag:blogs.spectrum.ieee.org,2008:/riskfactor//12.4850</id>
   
   <published>2008-06-24T20:25:51Z</published>
   <updated>2008-06-24T21:30:22Z</updated>
   
   <summary> You just have to love government thinking. The inspector general of Social Security, Patrick P. O&apos;Carroll, released a report this week that called for the removal of Social Security numbers from Medicare cards that are used by more than...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Robert Charette</name>
      
   </author>
         <category term="Government" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   <category term="2176" label="Government" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="506" label="Risk" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="644" label="Security" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/">
      <![CDATA[<img alt="medical-symbol.gif" src="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/medical-symbol.gif" width="200" height="189" />

You just have to love government thinking.

The <a href="ttp://www.ssa.gov/oig/">inspector general</a> of <a href="http://www.ssa.gov/">Social Security</a>, <a href="http://www.ssa.gov/oig/organization/organization_bios/execstaff.htm">Patrick P. O'Carroll</a>, released a report this week that called for the removal of Social Security numbers from Medicare cards that are used by more than 40 million Americans. O'Carroll wants the numbers removed because they pose a risk of i<a href="http://www.socialsecurity.gov/pubs/idtheft.htm">dentity theft</a>.

As <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/22/washington/22medicare.html">quoted</a> in the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/">New York Times</a>, O'Carroll said, "Displaying such information on Medicare cards unnecessarily places millions of individuals at risk for identity theft. We do not believe a federal agency should place more value on convenience than the security of its beneficiaries' personal information."

So how do <a href="http://www.medicare.gov/">Medicare</a> officials respond?

It tells the inspector general to go take a hike.

"Charlene M. Frizzera, chief operating officer of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, played down the risk of identity theft from the misuse of Medicare cards. If the government suddenly issued new Medicare cards or identification numbers, she said, it could startle or alarm beneficiaries. 'We don't want to scare them,' Frizzera said," in the Times story.

I wonder what studies Medicare did investigating "senior fright" when social security numbers are replaced by some other number. Virginia has been removing social security numbers from driver licenses for the past few years - maybe Medicare can conduct a survey of how frightened seniors became when that change-over happened. 

The real reason, of course, is that Medicare thinks making the change would be too costly. 

According to the story: 

Frizzera said that "issuing new Medicare cards would be 'a huge undertaking.' The agency would need three years to plan such a move and eight more years to carry it out, she said."

In addition, "Medicare officials estimate that it would cost $500 million to change their computer systems if they issued new ID numbers to beneficiaries. Doctors, hospitals and other health care providers use those numbers in filing claims with Medicare, which pays a billion claims a year."

Hmm, it would take 11 years to fully make the change? And Medicare is worried that seniors would be "startled" by the "sudden" change? 

Given the current life expectancy of many of those currently on Medicare, no doubt many would be dead before they ever saw their numbers change given this project schedule. 

And other organizations, like Blue Cross and Blue Shield, who cover 100 million individuals, stopped using Social Security numbers years ago. They didn't need 11 years or $500 million that I know of.

According to the story, only Congress can force Medicare to make the change. Maybe it needs to before the wave of baby boomers like me really begin to retire.

BTW, I for one, promise not to be scared if Medicare makes the change. And I'll even pay a one-time $20 fee towards the conversion when I sign up for Medicare. 




]]>
      
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>Think What the OSS Could Have Done with Office IT Systems</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/2008/06/think_what_the_oss_could_have.html" />
   <id>tag:blogs.spectrum.ieee.org,2008:/riskfactor//12.4845</id>
   
   <published>2008-06-23T10:39:43Z</published>
   <updated>2008-06-23T11:47:17Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Tom Shoop&apos;s blog at Government Executive magazine (where I also blog occasionally), has an interesting post that I have been meaning to write about. Tom found posts (JOHO the Blog, BoingBoing) about a recent Enterprise 2.0 conference in Boston where...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Robert Charette</name>
      
   </author>
         <category term="Government" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   <category term="2176" label="Government" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/">
      <![CDATA[Tom Shoop's <a href="http://blogs.govexec.com/fedblog/2008/06/sabotage_or_standard_office_pr.php">blog</a> at <a href="http://www.govexec.com/">Government Executive</a> magazine (where I also <a href="http://techinsider.nextgov.com/">blog</a> occasionally), has an interesting post that I have been meaning to write about. Tom found posts (<a href="http://www.hyperorg.com/blogger/2008/06/11/simple-sabotage/">JOHO the Blog</a>, <a href="http://www.boingboing.net/2008/06/11/sabotage-manual-from.html">BoingBoing</a>) about a recent <a href="http://www.enterprise2conf.com/conference/">Enterprise 2.0</a> conference in Boston where two CIA officials gave a presentation called "From the Bottom-Up: Building the 21st Century Intelligence Community" that focused on <a href="http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/templates/SIGNAL_Article_Template.asp?articleid=1400&zoneid=31">Intellipedia</a>. 

Apparently, during the presentation, the officials referenced the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Office_of_Strategic_Services">Office of Strategic Services</a> (OSS) 1944 <a href="http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/p4013coll9&CISOPTR=307&filename=308.pdf"> field manual</a> on sabotage techniques.  The purpose of the manual was to provide OSS agents with "simple sabotage" methods involving the "human element" that "frequently is responsible for accidents, delays, and general obstructions even under normal circumstances."

The manual goes on to say, "The potential saboteur should discover what types of faulty decisions and non-cooperation are <em>normally</em> found in his kind of work and should then devise his sabotage as to 'enlarge the margin for error.'"

The types of things that the saboteur should look for? (I cribbed this mostly from Tom who copied it verbatim from the manual)

Under section 11, General Interference with Organisations and Production, the OSS manual lists several approaches to consider, such as, for:

(a) Organizations and Conferences

(1) Insist on doing everything through "channels." Never permit short-cuts to be taken in order to expedite decisions.
(2) Make "speeches." Talk as frequently as possible and at great length. Illustrate your "points" by long anecdotes and accounts of personal experiences. Never hesitate to make a few appropriate "patriotic" comments.
(3) When possible, refer all matters to committees, for "further study and consideration." Attempt to make the committees as large as possible — never less than five.
(4) Bring up irrelevant issues as frequently as possible.
(5) Haggle over precise wordings of communications, minutes, resolutions.
(6) Refer back to matters decided upon at the last meeting and attempt to re-open the question of the advisability of that decision.
(7) Advocate "caution." Be "reasonable" and urge your fellow-conferees to be "reasonable" and avoid haste which might result in embarrassments or difficulties later on.
(8) Be worried about the propriety of any decision — raise the question of whether such action as is contemplated lies within the jurisdiction of the group or whether it might conflict with the policy of some higher echelon.
]]>
      <![CDATA[(b) Managers and Supervisors

(1) Demand written orders.
(2) "Misunderstand" orders. Ask endless questions or engage in long correspondence about such orders. Quibble over them when you can. ...
(6) In making work assignments, always sign out the unimportant jobs first. See that the important jobs are assigned to inefficient workers of poor machines.
(7) Insist on perfect work in relatively unimportant products; send back for refinishing those which have the least flaw. ...
(9) When training new workers, give incomplete or misleading instructions.
(10) To lower morale and with it, production, be pleasant to inefficient workers; give them undeserved promotions. Discriminate against efficient workers; complain unjustly about their work.
(11) Hold conferences when there is more critical work to be done.
(12) Multiply paper work in plausible ways. Start duplicate files.
(13) Multiply the procedures and clearances involved in issuing instructions, pay checks, and so on. See that three people have to approve everything where one would do.
(14) Apply all regulations to the last letter.

(c) Office Workers

(1)Make mistakes in quantities of material when you are copying orders. Confuse similar names. Use wrong addresses.
(2) Prolong correspondence with government bureaus.
(3) Misfile essential documents.
(4) In making carbon copies, make one too few, so that an extra copying job will have to be done.
(5) Tell important callers the boss is busy or talking on another telephone.
(6) Hold up mail until the next collection.
(7) Spread disturbing rumors that sound like inside dope.

(d) Employees

(1) Work slowly. Think out ways to increase the number of movements necessary on your job ...
(2) Contrive as many interruptions to your work as you can...When you go to the lavatory, spend a longer time there than is necessary....
(4) Pretend that instructions are hard to understand, and ask to have them repeated more than once. ...
(5) Do your work poorly and blame it on bad tools, machinery, or equipment. Complain that these things are preventing you from doing your job right.
(6) Never pass on your skill and experience to a new or less skillful worker.
(7) Snarl up administration in every possible way. Fill out forms illegibly so that they will have to be done over; make mistakes or omit requested information in forms.
(8) If possible, join or help organize a group for presenting employee problems to the management. See that the procedures adopted are as inconvenient as possible for the management, involving the presence of a large number of employees at each presentation, entailing more than one meeting for each grievance, bringing up problems which are largely imaginary, etc

Now, this was before the ubiquitousness of IT. Imagine what the OSS would have come up with if IT had been around - or maybe they already anticipated it.

The OSS sabotage manual would make for a great game of <a href="http://www.tbs.com/stories/story/0,,70071,00.html">office meeting bingo</a> (everyone gets one score for being at the meeting (B11)). ]]>
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>Sainsbury&apos;s On-Line Problems Cost It At Least $2M</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/2008/06/sainsburys_online_problems_cos.html" />
   <id>tag:blogs.spectrum.ieee.org,2008:/riskfactor//12.4837</id>
   
   <published>2008-06-20T16:59:40Z</published>
   <updated>2008-06-20T18:13:12Z</updated>
   
   <summary> The UK’s third largest grocer Sainbury’s has finally fixed a software problem that brought down its on-line grocery service, according to Vnunet.com. The problem which kept Sainsbury&apos;s from being able to process customer orders, started the evening of the...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Robert Charette</name>
      
   </author>
         <category term="Software" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   <category term="961" label="Glitch" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="128" label="Internet" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="1093" label="Software" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/">
      <![CDATA[<img alt="Sainsbury.gif" src="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/Sainsbury.gif" width="175" height="56" />

The UK’s third largest grocer <a href="http://www.sainsburys.co.uk/home.htm">Sainbury’s</a> has finally fixed a software problem that brought down its on-line grocery service, <a href="http://www.vnunet.com/vnunet/news/2219690/sainsbury-fixes-shopping-glitch">according</a> to <a href="http://www.vnunet.com/">Vnunet.com</a>. The problem which kept Sainsbury's from being able to process customer orders, started the evening of the 17th of June. Customers who had placed orders discovered that they were canceled, which left many rather unhappy.

As <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/sainsburys-counts-the-cost-of-its-website-crashing-851124.html">reported</a> by the <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/">Independent</a>, “Sainsbury's delivers to 90,000 customers a week and their average spend is thought to be about £80 per transaction… the technical glitch has already cost the grocer well over £1m in lost online sales.”

Sainsbury’s competitors were quick to jump on its problems, with <a href="http://www.asda.co.uk/corp/home.html">ASDA</a>, for example, offering “free delivery on home shopping when [customers] enter a promotional code.”

The embarrassment factor of the problem was also magnified as a result of some unfortunate timing. Sainsbury’s chief executive <a href="http://www.j-sainsbury.co.uk/index.asp?pageid=81&management_id=jking">Justin King</a> was boasting to <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/City_of_London">City</a> analysts about the growth of its online site during a first quarter results presentation on the morning of the 18th of June, just as the problem was becoming public. 

“The online operation is continuing to perform well, with sales growth at over 40 per cent,” King <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/sainsburys-counts-the-cost-of-its-website-crashing-851124.html">reportedly</a> said.

I am sure King was rather incensed not to be informed about the problem before he gave his presentation. 

Sainsbury’s has offered the approximately 20,000 shoppers affected by the problem a £10 voucher as compensation
]]>
      
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>Electronic Health Record Usage in the US Still Low</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/2008/06/electronic_health_record_usage.html" />
   <id>tag:blogs.spectrum.ieee.org,2008:/riskfactor//12.4833</id>
   
   <published>2008-06-19T14:09:55Z</published>
   <updated>2008-06-19T15:22:51Z</updated>
   
   <summary> Various news outlets ran stories on the New England Journal of Medicine&apos;s (NEJM) survey results published yesterday regarding doctors&apos; usage of electronic health record (EHR) in the US. The survey, which involved 2758 doctors, found that while doctors who...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Robert Charette</name>
      
   </author>
         <category term="Health" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   <category term="935" label="Electronic Health Record" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2657" label="Health IT" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/">
      <![CDATA[<img alt="Medical-record-1.gif" src="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/Medical-record-1.gif" width="175" height="92" /

Various news outlets ran <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/19/technology/19patient.html?em&ex=1214020800&en=f55677b991e18137&ei=5087%0A">stories</a> on the <a href="http://content.nejm.org/">New England Journal of Medicine's</a> (NEJM) <a href="http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/full/NEJMsa0802005v1">survey results</a> published yesterday regarding doctors' usage of electronic health record (EHR) in the US. The survey, which involved 2758 doctors, found that while doctors who use EHRs overwhelmingly believe that they improve the timeliness and quality of patient care, less than 20% of all doctors actually are using them.

However, the NEJM survey found that only 4% of US doctors have access to what would be considered to be a "fully functional" EHR system as opposed to a "basic" EHR system. The survey report noted that, "The principal differences between a fully functional system and a basic system were the absence of certain order-entry capabilities and clinical-decision support in a basic system."

The report breaks down usage by medical practice size. Doctors working in medical practices having 50 or more doctors, some 50.5% of those practices have installed EHR systems. Those with 11 to 50 in the practice, the percentage drops to 29.3%. Those medical practices consisting of 1 to 3 doctors, the percentage which have installed EHR systems is only 8.6%. 

Unsurprisingly, the main reason for the low EHR adoption rate is mainly financial, although other factors were cited in the NEJM survey report: "Among physicians who did not have access to an electronic-records system, the most commonly cited barriers to adoption were capital costs (66%), not finding a system that met their needs (54%), uncertainty about their return on the investment (50%), and concern that a system would become obsolete (44%)." 

Without major financial incentives, I don't see the wide-spread adoption of EHR systems in the US anytime soon, and definitely not by the 2014 deadline President Bush <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/technology/economic_policy200404/chap3.html">set out</a> in 2004.

]]>
      
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>Let the Baggage Wars Begin</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/2008/06/let_the_baggage_wars_begin.html" />
   <id>tag:blogs.spectrum.ieee.org,2008:/riskfactor//12.4826</id>
   
   <published>2008-06-17T13:56:57Z</published>
   <updated>2008-06-17T15:52:28Z</updated>
   
   <summary>The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) has an article today on the new &quot;Battle of the Overhead Bins&quot; that will be taking place soon on airplanes across the nation as airlines like American, US Airways and United begin imposing fees for...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Robert Charette</name>
      
   </author>
         <category term="Aviation" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   <category term="1876" label="Aerospace" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/">
      <![CDATA[The Wall Street Journal (<a href="http://online.wsj.com/home/us">WSJ</a>) has an <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121363099388877743.html?mod=todays_us_personal_journal">article</a> today on the new "Battle of the Overhead Bins" that will be taking place soon on airplanes across the nation as airlines like <a href="http://www.aa.com/aa/i18nForward.do?p=/travelInformation/baggage/baggageAllowance.jsp">American</a>, <a href="http://www.usairways.com/awa/Content/traveltools/baggage/baggagepolicies.aspx">US Airways</a> and <a href="http://Unitedhttp://www.united.com/page/middlepage/0,6823,1031,0">United</a> begin imposing fees for checking in some passengers' first bag. The story notes that American and United "will station airline employees or hired contract workers at entrances to security screening lanes to intercept customers exceeding the carry-on limit of one bag small enough to fit in an overhead bin and one 'personal item' like a purse or briefcase."

The battle for bin space has become been pretty intense over the past few years, as airline baggage handling has gone from bad to worse. Then, as the airlines have reduced their number of flights to save money, open overhead space has become even tougher to find as airplanes are flying full. Now, with this additional fee, things will start to get even uglier, especially on planes with small overhead compartments (anyone know for certain which aircraft have the smallest overhead bins?). 

I wonder how long it will be before a fight breaks out on an airplane over overhead space, or at security when the "baggage police" try to enforce carry-on baggage rules.  If not this summer, I think at least one incident on an airplane will occur during the winter months when coats begin to compete with carry-on luggage for overhead space.

The WSJ story also mentions that passenger check-in times at airline ticket counters will likely grow as ticket agents need additional time to charge passengers the new baggage fee. Passengers who require to check their luggage need to think about arriving even earlier than "normal." 

For those airlines like United which has severely cut back on the number of ticket agents over the past few years as it rolled out automation to make passenger check-in more self-service, the new fee is likely to increase the level of customer dissatisfaction way above where it stands now. United ticket agents aren't going to be too happy either, as their stress level will climb even higher dealing with unhappy passengers.

The airlines haven't talked about from what I have seen or read about whether the bag fee will be refunded if your checked luggage doesn't make it to your destination. I doubt that they will, but if you have to pay for your bags separately now, I think its only fair that passengers get their bag fee refunded when their luggage doesn't arrive with them.

American Airlines claims the new fee will generate $350 million in new revenue, but I suspect that this is more a hope than anything else.  I don't doubt that airlines, given that overhead bin space is valuable real estate, are thinking about how to charge passengers who board the airline first to pay for the privilege. I also suspect that as fuel costs continue to rise, it will only be a matter of time before some airline says that carry-on luggage will be weighed and passengers charged accordingly.  

The days of <a href="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/2008/06/dare_to_fly_derrieair_1.html#more">Derrie-Air</a> may not be too far off.
]]>
      
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>UK Designing Sat Nav Sign for Truck Drivers</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/2008/06/uk_designing_sat_nav_sign_for.html" />
   <id>tag:blogs.spectrum.ieee.org,2008:/riskfactor//12.4823</id>
   
   <published>2008-06-16T17:51:16Z</published>
   <updated>2008-06-16T19:02:17Z</updated>
   
   <summary> The London Telegraph reported recently that the UK government is designing a new sign for lorry drivers in an attempt to stop them from driving down roads that are not suitable for their size or weight. The story noted...</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Robert Charette</name>
      
   </author>
         <category term="Technology and Society" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   <category term="961" label="Glitch" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="1879" label="GPS" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/">
      <![CDATA[<img alt="Sat-nav.gif" src="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/Sat-nav.gif" width="91" height="140" /> 

The <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/">London Telegraph</a> <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/howaboutthat/2094798/New-road-sign-to-warn-lorry-drivers-against-unsuitable-sat-nav-short-cuts.html">reported</a> recently that the UK government is designing a new sign for lorry drivers in an attempt to stop them from driving down roads that are not suitable for their size or weight. The story noted that "Ena Wickens, 79, has spent £20,000 repairing her home in <a href="http://www.visionofbritain.org.uk/place/place_page.jsp?p_id=6275">Mereworth, Kent</a>, which has been repeatedly struck by lorries sent down her narrow lane."

The new sign is believed to show "a lorry with a red line through it and will not include any words." I think the one shown on the blog that also depicts the sat nav itself is a better design, myself.

Interestingly, there is no penalty whatsoever for ignoring the new sign, so some are questioning the usefulness as well as future effectiveness of the exercise.

I have my own beef with sat nav systems - or at least the one that came with my new car. It is user unfriendly to say the least. I knew something was up when I saw that the system's user manual was 240 pages long and in places the instructions were about clear as mud on a spring day. I have found that the nav system is very use if you already know the route, want to use the system as a means to generate verbal reminders for upcoming turns, or when you want to know where there is a gas station or someplace to eat along the way.

However, if you want to take an alternate route other than the three it suggests, you have to spend so much time trying to work around the system constraints (the GPS is very insistent that it knows best) that when you get done, you become so frustrated that you want to have the system taken out of the car and your money refunded. Also, you had better be a USA county expert, because many town names are omitted from its database, although all counties seem to be represented.

I haven't been <a href="http://">sent off a cliff </a>yet, but I have faith, given the antagonistic relationship I am quickly developing with it, that sooner or later my sat nav system will undoubtedly try. 

]]>
      
   </content>
</entry>
<entry>
   <title>BA CIO Apologizes for Terminal 5 Problems</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/2008/06/ba_cio_apologizes_for_terminal.html" />
   <id>tag:blogs.spectrum.ieee.org,2008:/riskfactor//12.4818</id>
   
   <published>2008-06-13T22:35:18Z</published>
   <updated>2008-06-13T23:24:13Z</updated>
   
   <summary> Paul Coby, the chief information officer at British Airways (BA) reportedly made a public apology at the Forrester IT Forum in Lisbon last week for the problems that happened during the opening of London&apos;s Heathrow´s Terminal 5 in March....</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Robert Charette</name>
      
   </author>
         <category term="Aviation" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   <category term="1876" label="Aerospace" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="1938" label="Baggage Systems" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="1093" label="Software" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
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Paul Coby, the chief information officer at <a href="<a href="http://www.britishairways.com/travel/home/public/en_gb?source=TOP_logo">British Airways</a> (BA) <a href="http://www.information-age.com/home/information-age-today/440936/british-airways-cio-apologises-for-t5-launch-debacle.thtml">reportedly</a> made a public apology at the<a href="http://www.forrester.com/events/eventdetail?eventID=2071"> Forrester IT Forum</a> in Lisbon last week for the <a href="http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/2008/03/heathrows_terminal_5s_never_en.html">problems</a> that happened during the opening of London's Heathrow´s <a href="http://www.terminal5.ba.com/en/splash.aspx">Terminal 5</a> in March.

Coby said that the problems had "seriously damaged" BA's reputation.

BA apparently has learned at least some lessons from it earlier problems. Last weekend, BA <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7438838.stm">successfully</a> moved an extra 30 BA flights to Terminal 5 from Terminal 4, bringing the total of daily flights to 424. The extra flights add another 7,000 passengers and 4,000 bags a day to Terminal 5, an increase in passenger flow of about 15%. More moves are planned for later this year.

While those passengers using Terminal 5 are probably happier than before, the trip in and out of Heathrow in general has become more difficult for everyone. Over the first quarter of 2008, <a href="http://travel.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/travel/business/article4131335.ece">only</a> 56% of flights left or arrived on schedule.  Last year it was 76%. All those flights canceled because of the problems at Terminal 5 don't count in the figure, because cancellations are not part of the on-time equation. 

One aviation consultant <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/jun/13/baa.theairlineindustry">said</a> "that the deterioration in punctuality at Heathrow might not cause a sharp drop in passenger numbers because the airport already has a bad reputation."

Well, I guess that is one way to positively spin the situation.

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